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Federal Reserve  System.InvestmeDt  and  the  Norrinal  Interest  Rate:
The  Variable  Veloclty  Case
Models  in  which  money  ente*  as an argument  of the  ut  ity  function  and models  in which  money
enters as an argument  of the production  function  are special cases  of a more general model in
which  both  hougeholds and firms hold money as a buffer between receipts and expenditures, in
an effort to avoid brokerage fees. A high nominal interest rate discourages  those purchases  which
must be financed out of previously accumulated cash balancee  while, at the same time, increasing
the  real resources devoted to  intermediation.  Depending on the  relative  strengths of theee two
effects, investment may be stimulated or depreeeed.
Evan F. Koenig
Research  Department
f'ederal Rcserve Bank of Dallas
Dallas, Texas 75222I.  INTRODUCTION
In  an earlier paper  (Koenig  [198?b]), I  examined the  rerationship between investment  and
the  nominal  interest  rate in  an economy where the  cash balances of households and firms  were
rigidly  linked to their  respective expenditures. In such an economy the nominal interest rate acts
like a tax  on agents' purchases. As a resurt, househords  are inclined  to save, rather  than  spend,
when the nominal  interest rate is reratively hi6h.  provided  that,  at the margin,  firms are able to
'  finance at least some of their  capital  spending out of contemporaneous earnings, this increase in
desired saving is only partially  ofiset by a decrease  in  desired investment.  Realized  investment is
thus greatest when the nominal  interest rate is high in comparison to its own moving average-a
ushort-run  Tobin effect.t
This  paper extends my earlier analysis to  the case in  which househords  and firms, at a cost
in  terms of real resources, are able to increase the velocity  of money.  In  this context it  is shown
that  the short-ri-D  Tobin  efect  may be reversed.  Intuitively,  when the  nominal  interest rate is
high, consumption  of financial services by households and firms may rise to such an extent that
any decline in the consumption of nan-financial  goods and services  is overwhelmed, reducing the
resources  available for investment.
As in my earlier paper, I allow for the possibiliiy that some  fraction,  I _,p1,  of firms' invesrmenr
expenditures can be financed from  contemporaneous earnings.  Unless p  equals zero, there is a
"Stockman effect":  A tendency for investment to be depressed  whenever the nominal interest rate
is expected to be higher, on average,  in the future than it has been in the past (stockman  {1ggr]).
when  p equals unity,  so all investment must be financed out  of accumulated assets,  the money
balances of the representative firm  can be interpreted as an argument of its production  function.
Regardless  of the value of p, the money balances  of households  may be thought of as an argument-
along with  gross household spending-of  an indirect  utility  function.  Thus  both  of  the  most
frequently  used methods of modeling the role of money-as  an argument of the household utility
function,  and as an argument of the production  function-are  special cases  of model developed
here.
This is a substantially less  restrictive framework than that employed by Fischer [1979],  Sweeney[losl],  Cohen [1985],  and Obstfeld It985], each  ofwhom  has also  examined the effects  of anticipated
policy in  an economy where the velocity of money is variable.r
Section II discusses  the utility  and profit  maximization  problems facing households  and firms,
respectively, and shows how the behavior of economic agents  is affected by the presence  of real costs
of financial management.  A  dynamic  analysis is undertaken in  Section III,  and it  is shown that
the short-run  Tobin effect may operate in reverse. A summary concludes the paper. Throughout,
agents are assumed to possess  perfect foresight.
II.  TIIE  MODEL:  PRELIMINARY  ANALYSIS
Intuition
Imagine a world in which each  household receives  wage and dividend income at discrete inter-
vals, but  desires  to purchase and consume output  continuously through time.  As in Baumol [19s2]
or Tobin  [1956],  if it' is costly to move into or out of interest-bearing  securities, the household will
choose  to hold money as a buffer between its receipts and its expenditures. The more money held,
on average, between wage and dividend  distributions,  the  lower the  brokerage fees paid  by the
household, but,  also, the lower the household's interest income.
Imagine, similarly,  that  each firm  receives  a continuous flow of revenue, but  makes wage and
dividend  distributions,  and some investment expenditures, at discrete intervals.2 Then firms, like
households, will  use money as a buffer between receipts a.nd  disbursements, in  an effort  to hold
down brokerage costs.
If  disbursements are staggered through  time  across a large number of firms,  thei  a.ggregate
flow will  appear continuous, yet both firms and households  will  maintain  positive money balances.
This suggests  that  the economy described above be approximated by a continuous-time  model of an
"averageo household a.nd "average" firm, each of which carries money in order to avoid brokerage
fees.3  It  is just  such a model which I develop below.
The Representative Household
ExPlicit  Ilansaction  Costs. The re;iresentative household chooses  time-paths  for its real balances
(m)  and the rate of change of its total  real wealth  (i)  so as to maximizeu(c(t))exp  (-Bt)dt
subject to
r(s)dsldt  < @(0)
a(t)  = o(t)r(r)  - ["(r)  + rn(r)i(t)  + 
"(c(t), 
-(r))], t3)
and a(t)  )  0, where i  is the nominal  rate of interest, r  the real interest rate, and c consumption
net  of  (transactions 
costs"-i.e.,  net  of the cost of those financial services which  the household
purchases in  an effort  to economize on its money balances. The household is assumed to regard
iis  initial  wealth  and the  real and nominal  interest rates as exogenous.  The wealth  variable is
meant to  include  not  only  the  asset-holdings of the  household, but  also the present discounted
value of future  wages and net (lump-sum)  governmental transfers. Tlansaction  costs, ?(c,m),  are
a function  of net  consumption  and the real balances held by the household. In the model of the
demand for  money due to Baumol  and robin,  for example, transaction  costs are proportional  to
the velocity  of money:  T(c,m)  :  rcfm,  where r  represents the real cost of each money-bond  or
bond-money  exchange. In a cash-in-advance model, on the other hand, transaction costs are zero
for c less  than  m, and explode to infinity  if households attempt  to increase c beyond m.
The utility  function,  u(.),  is assumed to be increasing and strictly  concave. Further,  1f  ?"
is assumed to  be positive,  so that  an increase in  net  consumption,  real balances held constant.
must imply  an increase in gross consumption expenditures, n =  c + ?.  With  ut  f (l  + T"\  $ea\er
than zero, equa,lity will  hold in constraint  (z).  It  is also reasonable to require  thar T."T^,*  -  T"z,*
be negative:  without  increasing returns  in  the transactions technology, using money as a buffer
between receipts and expenditures would make little  sense.
The necessary  conditions for an optimum  include:
o:  Ea: ),  - u'l$+T.),
a
(1) J"
l"* VAI+  'n(,)i(r)  + 
"(c(r), 
m(t))le  ,o  I Io'
(2)
(4)o  = H,_  = -(; +  r,")u,  I  e a  r"),
,\: BI  - II_  _  B^-  nt  lG+,r.),
where rr  :  z(c) +,\a  is the Ham  tonian function.  It is arso  required that  (4) and (b) correspond to
a maximum  of the Hamiltonian.  For this it  is sufficient that  the Hamiltonian  function  be strictly
concave  in the control variables. This means that  the utility  function  must be sufrciently  concave
to oYercome  increasing returns in the transactions technology. Strict  concavity of Il  also implies
that  T,n,o >  0, so that  transaction  costs decrease  at a decreasing rate as rea.l balances expand.
(For details, see  the Appendix.)  From (5), households  add to their real balances  until  the resultant
marginal  decrease  in the costs of cash-management equals the nominal interest rate.
Marginal  transaction  costs, Q,  act just  rike a sales tax  revied on household purchases: one
unit of gross  expenditure will  purchase  only r/(1+  r.)  units of output  for actual consumption.  Ac-
cordingln  households  prefer to make their purchases  when marginal transaction costs are relativelv
low. Formally, combine equations (+) and (O) and rearrange terms to obtain
itfu':B-r+i./(t+7").
The corresponding condition  would  be  'fu'  :  p -  r in  an economy in  which transactions costs
were identically  equal to zero.
It  seems  reasonable to suppose that,  given the nominal interest rate, the more purchases an
individual  expects to ma.ke  the more cash he will  plan to carry. Since, from  equation (S),
dm -  - {r"," |?,",*)dc  -  (t /r,",")a;, (8)
this means that  fl-  must be negative. It also seems  reasonable  to suppose  that for a given nominal
interest rate,  by spending more (increasing c),  an individual  ought  to be able to purchase more




(7)dc  _ ld,a  * (r,"/r^,")d;lll(t  + 
"") 
_ r", (7,"/7,",")1.  (e)
Net consumption will  be increasing in gross consumption expenditure, given the nominal interest
rate, if and only if 1 -1.  e  is greater than 7.,"(7,_  1?,.,*).
From equation  (8), given net consumption, t'he higher is the nominal interest rate, the lower
are real money balances. But  [-  is less  than zero-i.e.,  the marginal cost of purchasing output  is
high when real balances are low'  [t  follows that  for any given real interest rate, net consumption
will  be lower the greater is the nominal interest rate and, consequently, net consumption will  fall
through time if the nominal interest rate is rising through time.  The latter result can be formalized
by expanding equation (?), using (8) to eliminate #:
i :  \2  tr,","(,  - il  + 9","  / (L  + r"))i I l@  aa  H,*,_  _ HZ.,*l  (r + r)1. (10)
By strict  concavity of IJ, the denominator ofthe  expression  on the right-hand-side  of this equation
is positive'  Thus d is increasing in  the real rate of interest and decreasing in  i'.  The smaller is
ut'  f ut in magnitude, the smaller is Eaa{,onn -  Hf;,*,  ard so the more sensitive is net consumption
to changes  in interest rates. Intuitively,  the Iess  curvature there is in the utility  function, the easier
it  is for households to shift consumption through time.
Total  transaction  costs respond ambiguously to  changes in  the  nominar interest  rate.  An
increase  ia r'reduces real balances, plaring upwerd pressure  on transaction costs, but also decreases
net consumption,  which may place downuard.  pressure on transaction coots. Formally, i  :  i?" +
titT,n, or, using equations (S) and (10) to eliminate rh and c,
i  - ^2{(r.r,",*  - r^r",  )Q  - B)
+ Ig"r",. - r, r;  I $ + r") + r,_u,,  I  u,l;\  I I@  aa  H,*, _ H3) I  + Ul
The coefficients of r  and r' cannot, in general, be signed.






A :  .\2[(t  + r")r.,,* _ r, r.,*]Il@aa[*,*  _ H?,  )(r + r.)l
B :  \21(7,"7."/(1  + ?:) - 7.,-)  - T, rl,f  u,I/l(Haun,^,-  - H?,_)(r  + T.)1.
From strict  concavity of rr  and the discussion accompanying equation (g),,a  is positive. The sign
of B'  on the other hand, is ambiguous. If the utility  function  has rittre curvature (u,,/u,l  is small),
so that  net consumption  is sensitive to changes in the nominal  interest rate, gross spending and
net consumption will  both fall when the nominal interest rate is high (B will  be positive), and the
amount  of output  available for  investment will  tend to rise.  If  the utility  function  is sufficiently
concave however, B  will  be negative, and the  decrine in  net  consumption  which  occurs as the
nominal interest rate goes  up will be more than ofset by increased  expenditure on financial services.
Total  household expenditure  will  increase, tending to reduce the  amount  of output  available for
investment.
Real Balances as an Areument  of the Utilitv  Function.a The analysis of the representative house-
hold  can easily be translated  into  the  more streamlined notation  of Sidrauski  [1962].  Define a
new instantaneous  utility  function, y(., .), bV U(c -t T(c,m),m)  :  ,.(").u One then has U" = ,\ :
t'/(l  + T")  >  0, and U,* :  -\7,  :  -?."u,/(t  *  ?"), from which it follows rhar rhe necessary
conditions for an optimum  can be rewritten  as
U"./U,:;
i,1u": p  -,.
strict  concavity  of the  function  ri  is equivarent to  strict  concavity  of  I/(.,.).  Further,  the
conditions Q,,,  < 0 and (1+?.)  > 7.,"(7,  /7,.*)  are satisfied if and only if both gross  consumption
and real balances are normal goods. (See  the Appendix.)
In the new notation, equation  (12) becomes
(5')
(6')i=  -l^zu:/^l? - F)  -lu,, u"/^l;, (12')
where A  =U""U,no-a:,  >  0 and, by normality,  A2=  (U,.,  U" _ U,*U,,)|U:  <  0.  In the
discussion following  equation  (12) it  v/as pointed  out  that  gross expenditures  need not  decline
with  net consumption in response  to an increase  in the nominal interest rate.  Equation  (l2r)  says
thai  this will  occur precisely when the cross-partial  derivative of the Sidrauski utilitv  function is
negative.6
Though  the  Sidrauski  formulation  of the  household maximization  problem  is notationally
convenient, it  is not very intuitive,  and so will  not be employed in the analysis which follows.
The Representative Firm
Explicit  rYansaction costs.  The representative firm  has rear gross revenue N/(K/iv),  where K
and l[  denote, respectively, the capital and labor available to the firm.  The production  function,
/(.),  is required to be strictly  concave,  wiih  /r(0)  :  oo and .f,(*)  <  p + 6, where 6 is rhe rate of
depreciation.  For analytic simplicity,  each  worker is assumed  to provide one unit of labor, and the
number of workers per firm  is exogenously fixed.7
There are two diferent  types ofexpenditures:  those financed out of contemporaneous  earnings,
and those financed out of accumulated assets. The former are meant to correspond to expenditures
which  are, in  the  real world,  for  any particurar  firm,  usmootho with  respect to  time:  routine,
daily  purchases which  are made using same{ay  receipts.  The  latter  are meart  to  correspond
to  expenditures which  are, in  contrast,  ulumpyo:  wage and dividend  distributions  for  example,
made once per  month  or  once per  quarter.  Assuming that  sales revenue is smooth,  it  is only
lumpy  expenditures which Present a financial management problem.  If it  was interested solely in
minimizing  lost interest, a firm would immediatery put  any revenues,  net of smooth experi<litures,
into bonds, selling off the bonds whenever a lumpy payment felr due. In fact though, the firm will
want  to keep the number of money-bond  transactions-and,  hence, brokerage fees-in  check. It
can do so by allowing net receipts to accumulate as cash  for a time between each  purchase of bonds.
The higher its  average cash balancis relative  to its flow of net levenue, the lower the brokerage
fees the firm  incurs.Here 's =  s(,8, M)  will  be used to denote the brokerage costs which the representative firm
must pay, as a function  of its net revenues,  .8, and rear money barances,  M.  The most reasonabre
assumption is that  firms and households  have access  to the same transactions technology, so that
S(E'M)  -  T(E,M)  for all .E  and M.  Ir follows  that 1f  Sr  > e,Suu  > O,Spu  < 0,1+  sE >
SEM(SM/SMM),  and Sgs,gyy  -  S"ru <O.
Both  transaction costs and a fixed fraction,  l -  p, of investment expenditures will  be assumed
to be financed out of contemporaneous earnings.s Thus
eQ): n71/r1r1lN)  - (1_  p)li((r)  +  6K(t)  +  K(Ddfi'G\lK(t))l
- s(E(r),MG)),
(r3)
where K$(k/K)  is the cost of installing  new equipment.  Folowing  Hayashi [1982], /  is assumed
strictly  convex, with  {(O) :  d'(0)  :  0.
The firm  chooses  time-paths  for  *  and .t\1  which maximize the present discounted value of
its distributions  to households:e
I  o* o1r1*ot-  /-,(")a"lar,
(14)
subject to
o(t)  -  8111-  plk@  + dr{(r)  + K(t)oG@/K(r))l  - M(,)
- r(t)M(t)  + c(t),
where r  is the inflation  rate and G represents lump-sum  transfers received by the firm  from  the
monetary authority.  Both  a-  and G are exogenous  to the firm,  as is the real interest rate. r.
For optimality  it is necessary  that,
o  : Jk : c  - (1  + Q')lu  + 1t- p)/(r  + sg)l (16)
O=Jtu=n-l (17)
(15)
q=rq-Jx:rq-{f'/(r1  sa)-(r+d-  6'k/ro]p+  (1  -p)/(1  +sE)l}
8
(18)ir :  rn -  Ju  = rn + r + SM  /(L +  SE), (1e)
where J  =  D + qk  +  ol7  iu th"  Hamiltonian  function.
Just as marginal  transactions costs, ?",  act rike a sales  tax on household purchases,  here ss
acts like a tax on the firm's net revenue (E).  Thus, according to (rs),  it is the "after taxo marginal
product  of capital which measures  the payoff to be derived in the future from an additional unit  of
capital'  The marginal  cost of investment is also distorted  by marginal  transactions costs (c.f.  eq.
(16)), but only insofar as investment reduces net revenue-i,e.,  only insofar as p is less  than unity.
The implications  of these distortions  are most easily seen  when one ignores installation  costs.
Using equation  (16) to eliminate the shadow price, q, from  (18), one then has:
f' :  lp(t+,so)  + (l - p)lk+6)  + (t - p)sEl(l  + sE). (20)
When  all  investment  expenditures  are financed from  contemporaneous earnings (p  =  0),  only
changes  in marginal  transaction costs distort  the desired capital stock: firms want  a large capital
stock when they expect marginal transaction costs  to be lower in the future than they are currently.
Investment will  thus tend to  be greatest when SB is high relative  to  its past and future  values.
When p  equals unity,  only  the lcuel of ma.rginal transaction  costs matters:  the higher is Ss,  the
lower the capital stock desired. Hence investment will  tend to be greatest when Ss is expected to
be lower in the future  than it  has been in the past.
Combining (l7)  and (19),  one  has
-s*r/(r+sE):i, (21)
which says firms add to their real money balances  until  the resultant marginal decrease  in transac-
tion costs, adjusted for the ntax'  on net revenue,  is equal to the nominal interest rate.  Differentiate
(21) to obtain
471.[  :  l(Sy  SBa  - (t + ,9E,)SEM)  dE  -  (r + SE)2(];llto  + SE)SMM  - Su Snul.  (zz)Thus the  firm's  demand for  real balances is decreasing in  the nominal  interest rate.  It  will  be
increasing in the flow of net revenue  provided that  ,Sw,Sea  _ (1 + SE)SEM is positive, which I will
assume  to be the case.lo
second--order conditions are satisfied if the Hamiltonian  is strictly  concave in  k,  x,  *ra  m
(Mangasarian  [1966]). This  means that  f"  and,  $tt must  be large enough in  magnitude  to offset
increasing returns  to scale in the transactions technology. (See  the Appendix.)
Real Balances as a Factor of Production.  According  to  equation  (ll),  when pr equals unity,  net
revenue is a function  of capital,  labor,  and real balances alone.  Thus one can think  of real bal-
ances  as an argument of a net production function, E(K,N,M)d  la Levhari and patinkin 
[t96g].
Differentiation  of (13) establishes  that  Eps  :  l, /(l  +  Ss ) and Eu  _  _ Su l F  f  ^9s  ).  Further  dif_
ferentiation  establishes  that  to assume  sMsss  -  (r +,sE),ssM  > 0 in equation (22) is equivalent
to requiring  that  E6v  be positive-i.e.,  to requiring  that  capitar and money be complements in
production.
Identities  and Eouilibrium Conditions
The wealth  of the  representative household consists of its real money bala.nces,  the present
discounted value of the distributions  which it receives  from firms, and the present discounted value
of the lump-sum  transfers it receives  from the government:
r(u)dvlds. (23)
Of course,
,r(4  :  d(r)  - r(t).  p4)
If the government distributes money to households  and to firms at equal percentage  rates,ane will
also have
o(t)  =  ,'(r)  +  l,* WG)/r  +  g(")l*p  ? 1,"
o(t): ^(t)/^(t) + "(t)
o(t): M(t)/M(t)  + r(t),
10
(25a)
(256)where 9(t)  is the  common  growth  rate  of nominal  balances.  while  households and firms  rrear
governmental transfers as exogenous,  in market equilibrium  g :0m  and,  C :0M.
Take the time-derivative  of the right-hand-aide  of equation  (zs)  and equate it  to the right-
hand-side  of equation (S). Using (lS), (24), anil (25) one obtains
f :  c  + (L  +6ft  + ftd)  + (" + s/N), (26)
where ft(t)  :  K(t)lN  is the capitar/labor  ratio.  Thus output  per worker is split between consuml>
tion,  investment, and transaction costs per worker.
Steadv  State Comparative Statics
Equation  i7)  implies that  in  steady state the real rate of interest will  equal the rate of time
preference'  If  p  equals zero, so that  all investment is financed from  contemporaneous ealnrngs,
equation  (18) implies that  the amount of capital  per household in steady state is independent of
monetaxy policy. rt  then follows that  gross  output  and gross  consumption spending per household
are, in steady state, also  independent of monetary poricy. In general though, with  pr  > 0, the higher
is the steady-state nominal interest rate-or,  equivalently, the higher is the steady-state inflation
rate-the  lower are the capital stock, output,  and household spending. Rega.rdless  of the value of
;'r, a high  nominal  interest rate leads to reductions in  net consumption  and in  the real baf,ances
of households and firms.  Since utility  is a function  of net consumption  arone, if the government
wants to maximize the steady-state welfa.re  of the representative household, it  ought to drive the
nominal interest  rate to zero.11
III.  ANAIYSIS  oF  THE  MoDEL:  DYNAMICS
Intuition
The  intuition  underlying  the dynamic  anarysis  is simple.  Marginal  transaction  costs,  e,  act
like a sales  tax on households'  purchases  of output, the proceeds  of which are thrown away. A
constant  sales  tax does  not affect  the timing of desired  consumption.  Anticipated cianges  in the
tax rate d,o  have  an impact however:  households  r ant to concentrate  their consumption  in periods
during which the tax rate is relatively low. whether households'  gross  spending  moves  with net
l1consumption or agfist  it depends  on how responsive  net consumption is to changes  in the tax rate:
if ihe elasticity  of demand for net consumption is high, gross spending and net consumption wi
move together (the change  in the latter overwherming any opposing change  in totar tax payments);
if the elasticity  of demand for  net consumption is row, gross spending and net  consumption will
move inversely. If  gross spending and net purchases  move together, the supply of savings will  be
greatest when the marginal  tax rate on househord purchases  is reratively high,  If  gross spending
and net purchases  move in opposition to one another, the supply of savings w  l be greatest when
the tax rate is relatively  lou.
In  the  present context,  the  marginal  ntax"  rate  on household purchases, ?",  is higher ihe
higher is the  nominal  interest rate.  Accordingly,  net  consumption  tends to be lowest when the
nominal  int€rest rate is high relative to its own moving average (c.f.  eq.  (ro)).  Gross household
spending moves ur'ti  net  consumption if  the utility  function  has little  curvature  (r,r/2,  is small
in  magnitude),  for  then it  is easy for households to substitute  between cons-umption at different
dates, with  the result that  net consumption is very responsive to changes  in the nominal interest
rate'  Similarly,  gross household spending  moves opposite  net  consumption  if  u"/u,  is large in
magnitude.  In  the first case' when lu" futl  is small, there tends to be a positive short-run  Tobin
effect: a relatively high nominal interest rate reduces  household  spending, freeing output for capitaJ
investment.  (In eq. (12), B  is positive.)  If  lu,tfutl  is sufficiently large, on the other hand (so that
in eq. (fZ),  B  is negative), the short-run  Tobin effect may operate in reverse.
Similarly,  ,9s acts like a tax on firms, net earnings, the proceeds of which are, again, thrown
away'  The  parameter  p  measures the fraction  of investment expenditures which  are subject to
taxation:  in  calculating  taxable  earnings the firm  is able to  deduct  I  -  p  times  its investment
expenditures from its gross  revenue. Ifp  equals  zero, the firm is able to fully expense  its investment
spending. In this case  ii  is well known that  a invariant  tax rate has no distortionary  effect on the
timing  of investment.  Investment demand r's  distorted,  however, by  anticipated  changes  in  the
marginal  tax  rate:  firms will  want  to concentrate investment in periods in which the tax  rate is
relatively  high, for the revenues  earned in the future from  a machine installed today will  then be
taxed at a low rate, while the current cost of the machine will  be fully  deductible now, while the
tax rate is elevated.12If  p  is greater than  zero, investment expenditures are onry partially  deductible,  wh  e the
future  earnings from  an addition  to  the capitar stock a.re  fully  taxed.  Not  surprisingly,  in  this
situation  the higher the tax  rate, the lower the desired capital stock.  Investment will  tend to be
greatest when the tax rate is expected to be lower in the future  than it has been in the past.
Regardless of the value of p, the higher in total  are the tax liabilities  of firms, the fewer are
the resources  available to the private sector for investment.
In  the  present context  the  marginar tax  rate  on net  earnings, ,g6, is higher  the  higher is
the  nominal  interest  rate.  Accordingry, insofar as p  is less than  unity  there is a ten<iency for
investment  to  be greatest when the  nominal  interest  rate  is thought  io  be high  relative  to  its
own moving average: a positive short-run  Tobin efect.  Insofar as p is greater than zero there is
also a Stockman effect:  a tendency for investment to be greatest when the nomina"l  interesr rate
is expected to  be lower in  the future  than  it  has been in  the  past.  Regardless of the  value of
the parameter p, when the nominal interest rate is high, firms devote more resources  to financial
manaBement' reducing the resources  available for investment and tending to reverse  the short-run
Tobin effect.
In  summary, a nominal  interest rate which is high relative to its own moving  average  tends
to increase savings by reducing household demand for  non-financial  goods and services. It  also
tends, insofar as they  can be financed from  contemporaneous earnings, to increase firms, desire
to  undertake  investment projects.  on  the other  hand,  both  firms  and households may increase
spending on financial services  when the nominal interest rate is high, tending to reduce  the resources
available for investment.  The net effect is unclear: it depends, among other things, upon how easy
it  is to  substitute  between consumption  at  different dates, and upon the fraction  of investment
expenditures which can be financed from contemporaneous earnings.
Formal Analvsis
The model developed in Section II  can be linearized about its steady state, and reduced to a
second-order differential equation in ft, the capital stock per worker:
ip; - a,;i,py  - no(k(r)  - fr,)  = ao(;(4  - j-) + dr;.G).
l3
{27)Here  -4n,.41,  and Az are positive  constants,  and
ao  = [p(F  * 6)(sMsEE/(r  -1-  sr) -  szu)].  /Az
ar  : {(1  - p)lslasas/(r  + ss)  _ seul/(t+ sz)
+ (L/A)(f  /(p + r))[sMl(N(r  + sa))  _ BrMM]]"  /A2.
The  parameters A  and  I  are defined as in  equation  (12), while  J,  recall,  is the  Hamiltonian
function  from  the representative firm's  dynamic optimization  problem.  An  asterisk indicates that
an expression is evaluated at steady state.  Flom  the second--order  conditions, Jyy  <  0,  It  has
already  been assumed  that 1*  Sr  and  SySBsf  (ra,se)  -  56,14  are positive. (See  the discussion
preceding eq. (13), and following eq. (22).)  The coefficient c6 is thus non-negative.  The coefficient
a1 is ambiguous in sign.
In  its homogeneoug  form  (with  i(r)  -  f  :  i(t)  =  0), equation (ZT) has two roots, zt  and,  zz,
both  real, with  z1 < 0 <  22. The equation has, accordingly, but  one convergent solution:
,r(r)  - ft. [41(d(s)  - i(s)) -  (oo/(", -  z1))(i+(s)  -i-(s))]ds (28)
where
d(o)erp [(s -  u)  z2)du
d(u)ecp  [(s  -  t)21]&t
7(s): lz2/(a  - z1)li+(s)  +l-z1le2 - z1)li-(s).
It  follows immediately  that  investment is governed by
ft(t)  - ar(t(r)  -tG))  - ("olez-,,))(,-+(4  - -(r)). (2e)
Thus the rate of investment depends, in general, upon both the deviation  of the nominal interest
rate from  its own moving average-the  short-run  Tobin effect-and  upon the difference between
weighted averages  of future  and past nominal interest rates-the  Stockman efect.  The Stockman
fa _, - J  _*
i+@=a  l"
i-  ("):  -,1 
l"  -
74effect oPerates only  insofar  as p,  the  fraction  of  investment  which  cannot  be financed out  of
contemporaneous earnings, is greater than zero. (If  p :  9,oo  _  0.)  The effect is negative in the
sense  that  a rising nominal interest rate tends to depress investment.  The short-run  Tobin effect
is ambiguous in sign: when o1 is positive, a nominal interest rate which is high relative to its own
movir:g average  will  tend to stimulate  investmentl when a1 is negative, a relatively  high nominal
interest rate will  depress investment.
Household behavior  influences the sign of a1-and,  hence, the sign of the short-run  Tobin
effect-through  B.  The sign of B  in turn  depends upon the magnitude  of d, f u,,which  measures
how easy it is for households to substitute between consumption at different dates. The larger is
lu" fu'l,the  less  willing  are households  to shift net consumption, and the smaller will  be the fall in
net consumption caused  by an increase  in the nominal interest rate.  lflu',  futl  is so large as to make
B negative, any fall in net consumption is overwhelmed by increased  spending on financial services,
so that  gross consumption  spending actually  rises, tending  to  reduce the resources available for
investment.
The  behavior of firms influences the sign of a1 in  two conflicting  directions.  Insofar as p is
less than unity, so that  investment expenditures can be financed from  contempor.neous earnings,
firms have an incentive to concentrate investment in periods during which the lominal  interest rate
is relatively  high-for  in so doing, they can shift net earnings into periods during which marginal
transactions  costs are relatively /ou.  This effect  is captured by the term [(l _ p)(SMSEEI\+
SE) -  SEM)/(L  +  SE))-  /A2,  which  is always non-negative,  and which  is larger  the  smaller is
p'  On  the  other  hand, when the  nominal  interest  rate is high,  firms  devote more resources  to
financial management'  reducing the resources available for  investment.  This  is captured  by the
term l(f'/@  +6))SM/(ff.4.(1+  SE))]-/a",  whictr,  because  ,S,11  is less  than zero,  is always  negative.
Soecial  Cases
Monev as a Factor of Production.  Real money balances are often included as an argument of the
representative firm's  production  function.  When this  is done the money balances of households
are usually ignored.  As noted in Section II,  treating  money as a factor  of production  is justified
as long as p equals unity,  so that  all investment must be financed out  of previously accumulated
l5assets' To ignore the money balances of households amounts to assuming that  households  face a
transactions cost function  which  is identically  equal to  zero.  What  are the implications  of these
assumptions for the relationship between investment and the nominal  interest rate?
Wiih  ?(c, rn) =  0, r  is identically equal to c, and equation (7) becomes  i, f u, = B - r.  It follows
that  the coefficients A and B  in  equation (rz)  tate  on the values -u'f  ut' and.  zero, respectivery.
The coefficient 41, which determines the magnitude  and direction  of the short-run  Tobin eflect,
becomes
at = -sir/lQ*  sz)(u'/u,,)(J*kJuu  - G)N2I  .
Since ,S,y and ,tt  are both negative, while Jr7r7J1ay -  JzU,  is positive, the short_run Tobin effect
unambiguously  negative-i.e.,  investment is concentrated in  periods  during  which  the  nominal
interest rate is Joru  relative to its own moving average.
with  p equal to unity,  ao is greater than zero, so there is also a stockman effect.
Monev as a Consumer Good.  In  Section II  it  was argued that  one can legitimately  include the
representative household's real money balances along with  its gross consumption spending in an
indirect  utility  function,  l  la sidraudski  [1964,  when  this is done the real money balances  held
by firms are usuaJly ignored, which amounts to assuming S(E,M)  is identically zero.
with  s(8,  M)  =  0, desired investment is governed by the conventionar robin's  g moclel, as
formalized by Hayashi [1982]. Household saving continues to be distorted by changes  in the nominal
interest rate however. Equations (22) and (29) become
E1t1  -  Bi1t1+  lAt,'  lG + AQ,,lk)l-(k(t)  - k.)  _ IB  lG + Ad,  /k)1.; (27')
k(t)  = IB  /(r + A6,'  / ql.  GF)  - ;(r)1, (29')
respectively.ls Thus there is no Slockman effect, and the sign of the short-run  Tobin effect is the
same  as that  of B, which, in turn,  is the same as  that ofthe  cross-partial derivative ofthe  Sidrauski
utility function.
l6Baumol-Tobin  Technolosy with  Laree Firms.  In the two special cases  examined thus far. either
the transaction costs  facing households  or those facing firms have been arbitrarily  set equai to zero.
Are there situations in which households  and firms have arcess  to the same  transactions technology,
and yet the real balances  of one or the other can be ignored? The answer appears to be .yes':  for
certain transactions technologies the money barances  held by firms  are negligible, provided each
firm  has large number  of employees and can finance all of its investment from  contemDoraneous
earnings.l4
Suppose, for  example, that  the  transaction  costs borne by  households and  firms  obey the
Baumol-Tobin formulas f(c,m):  rcfm  znd,  S(E,M):  rE/M,  respectively,  where r is a fixed
parameter.  It  is well-known  that  with  a Baumol-Tobin  transactions technology, agents, demand
for  money rises with  the  square root  of the  volume of transactions,  given the  nominal  interest
rate.  In  the present context,  M  varies with  the square root  of E.  Now it  is easy to show that
the representative firm's  steady--state net earnings  , E* , vary directly  in proportion  to the number
of workers employed by the firm,  .rv, as lv  rises.  (Formally,  E" /N  has a positive, finite  rimit  as
t  --* -.)  It  follows that  as firms  get la"rger  and larger, the steady-state  money balances which
they maintain per employee  (M- /N),  shrink to zero, even though total money holdings (Ml)
increase. More importantly,  both  marginar transaction costs, .9!,  and many of the distortions  to
firm  behavior  d.oe  to  changes  in  marginal  transaction  costs, disappear in  the limit  as .rf goes ro
infinity.ls  In particular,  equations (Z?) and (29) simplify  to
k(t)  - UAB  d"  / k  + (B  + p6))  / Rl.  i1t1  + 1.t  7',  1  n1.  (k(r)  _ ft  .  ) :  (B  / $- ;
i1t1  :  1n  1  n1.  1i(r)  - tG)), /torr1
where 8  :  A6" lk  +  (t  -  p)  is always greater than  zero.  When firms  are able to finance all of
their investment from  contemporaneous earnings-so  p equals zero-these  equations are identical
to those obtained from a model in which money is purely a consumer,s good.  (compare  equations
(27")  and (29,,) to  (27') and (19,).)
Regardless  of whether or not ,p equals zero, according to equation (29r,) there is no Stockman
efect.  The short-run  Tobin effect has the same sign as B*.  When the transactions technology isBaumol-Tobin,  B :  m(m*  r)ll  -  (- cu"  /u')l/[z(-'cu,t/u') -  r]. Thus  rhe  shorr-run  Tobin  effect
is positive if and only if the steady-state  erasticity  of intertemporar  substitution, rf(-cu,,/wt)*,is
greater  than unity,16
rv.  SUMMARY
Households purchase financia.l services because the flow of wage and dividend  distributions
which they receive from firms is uneven relative to the flow of net consumption which they desire.
Firms  purchase financial services because  the flow of their  wage and dividend  distributions,  and,
perhaps, a portion  of their  investment expenditures, is uneven relative to  the flow of their  sales
receipts. Households and firms can reduce  the real costs  of financial management by holding money
as a buffer between receipts and expenditures.
When  the nominal  interest rate is high, households and firms reduce their  money balances.
with  lower money balances, households  find it  more difficult,  at the margin, to purchase outpur.
consumption  of non-financial  goods and services accordingly  tends to fall.  consumption  of fi-
nancial services by households and firms, on the other hand, may well rise.  If  totar consumption
spending falls, the tesources  available for investment increase. If total  consumption spending rrses,
investment is depressed.
APPENDIX:  SEC0ND-ORDER  CONDITTONS
Households
As noted in  Section II,  the second-order conditions associated with  the utility  maximization
problem  of the  representative household will  be satisfied if  the  Hamiltonian  function  is strictlv
concave in the control variables, ti and rn:
o  > Haa  = )lu"  /  u'  - r""l  (  + T.)ll  0 + T.) (,4.1)
o < H  aaH,n,n  -  n,u,_  = - ^2  lT**(u, f u,  ) -  (7".T, 
"" 
- r:")  l G + 7")l  l F + T.).
18
(A.2)Since  1 *  ?.  )  0,  u' )  0, and 4.?--  -  T:,* < 0, equation  (A.2) is satisfied  only if u,'  and  T*,o
are opposite  in sign. Since  u(.) is strictly concave,  ?,-,," must be positive.
To impose  inequalities  (A.r)  and (A.2) is equivarent  to requiring that the sidrauski utility
function  be  strictly  concave  in gross  consumption  expenditures,  r:  c+T(c,m),and real  barances,
rn' To see  this, diFerentiate  the formulas  for u" and u,," contained  in section II to obtain;
U," = (r,,  - ^7.")/(t +T.)2, (A.3)
u  "* = - l(u',  - ^r.")7,"  /  (L  + T.)  + ^7.,*l  / (r  + T.l, (,4.4)
u*,o :  (u" -  AT".)1?,"  / (r + T")),  _ ^7, * + 2AT.*T,  / (L  + T.). (A.5)
Equations  (A.3) -  (A.5) also  imply rhat the condirions  7.,* < O  and (t + 
".) 
> 7.,^(7."/f,.,*)  are
satisfied  if and only if both gross  consumption  and real balances  are normal goods.
Firms
As noted in Section  II, in order to guarartee  that the time-paths of capital and real balances
which  satisfy  the first-order conditions  of the firm are  maximizing,  it is sufficient  that the Hamilto-
nian function be strictly concave  in k , K , and  M.  when evaluated  at steady  state,  the concavity
conditions  take the form:l7
0> (J*,t).  :  -{(1  - t')zsen/(r+,eo)s*[r,+(r  - p)/(t+ sl)]o,,/K]-  (,4.6)
0  > (Jr.n).  :  - {lf - (r  - p)612  s  E  E  /  (1  + sE  )s  - I, /lN  (L+  ss)l  }- (A.7)
o > (Juu)* :  -[r/(1+  sE)].{[^sMM  + isDM]  + j[,sDEi  +,gl.M]]. (A.8)
o  < (JkkJMM  - ttr;.  :  {(1  _ r)2(,srE,suu  _ s'eil/(l  * se  )a
- Juulp* (t - p)lF  + sE)lo"  /K|.
l9
(A.e)0 < (J  a  7a  Jyy  - & *)'  :  llf  - (1  - p)612(sEEsM  M - szEi / G + s  E)4
1-  Juu f't  /lN(L + sc)l)'
(A.10)
0  < (J  k  k  r  K  K  - & *). : l(t  - p)  I  0+ sE,)21.  {sss  l(  I, - (t  - dil /  (r  +  s  E)lz  6,,  /  K
f'6"  /WKl  - (t  - p)saef,,/[N(l  +  sef]].. 
(A'1r)
In the special  case  in which p:1,  requiring ihat  (A.10) hold is equivalent  to requiring that
the firm's  net production  function,  E(K,N,M),  exhibit  decreasing  returns to scale  in capitar and
money when evaluated at steady state-i.e.,  to requiring  (Er<rcEuu  _  Ek d-  >  0.  To require
that  (A'7)  and (A's)  hold is equivalent to insisting that  there be diminishing  marginal returns to
K  and M-i.e.,  to requiring (Ex rc)* < 0 and (.Eyy)*  < 0.
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22FOOTNOTES
*  Senior Economist, Federal Reserve  Bank of Dallas. The author acknowledges  helpful conver-
sations with  Richard  c.  Hartma"n, colin  Lawrence, Randar  Mariger,  and Richard startz,  and the
insightful  comments of an anonymous referee. An earlier version of this paper u'as presented at the
1986 Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society. The views expressed  here are not necessarily
those of the Federal Reserve  Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
r  In each of the articles cited, the money balances  of firms are ignored. In addition, Fischer and
Cohen impose severe  restrictions on the indirect  utility  function  of the representative household.
2  Administrative  economies  of scale could easily make such occasional, discrete distributions
profit-maximizing.
3  The  urepresentative agent"  approach is analytically  convenient, but  has the  disadvantage
that  the role of money as a buffer between receipts and disbursements is not explicit.  In adopting
this approach I am also forced to abstract from the impact which monetary policy  might have on
the economy through  distributional  channels. See,  for example, Rotemberg [1gg4].
"  The analysis presented here differs from that  of Feenstra 11986]  principally  in that  Feenstra
finds conditions on transaction costs which are equivalent to  quasi-concaviiy of Sidrauski's utility
function,  while  the  analysis presented here finds conditions on transaction  costs and tl(.)  which
are equivalent to /uJl concavity. In a dynamic model, quasi-concavity  is not sufficient to guarantee
that  the first--order conditions correspond to a maximum.
6  The new function will  be well-defined for all positive r  and,  m provided that transaction costs
are zero when no output  is purchased ("(0,  m) =  0 for all m )  0), gross expenditures are strictly
increasing in net consumption (r + ?" > 0 for all m > 0), and gross  expenditures increase  without
bound  as net  consumption  goes to  infinity 
.rgg["  + T (c,rn)]  =  m  for  all  -  >  0).  The second
assumption, which  guarantees that  I/(.,.)  is single-valued, has already been discussed. The firstrules out utility  functions which are additively  separable in gross expenditures and real balances,
except those for which I/(0, m) equals _oo for all m > 0.
u  My  own empirical work suggests  strongly, however, that tI,,*  is positive. See  Koenig [19g7a].
7  Perhaps each firm  is located in  a separate town.  people are immobile  between towns, but
output  can be transported  costlessly.
8  This  notation  is consistent with  that  used in my earlier paper (Koenig  lrggzbi).  Empirical
results obtained by Mankiw  and Summers [19g6]  suggest that  pl is close to zero.
e  since both  the  supply of labor per  household and the number  of households per firm  are
exogenously fixed' the split  of D between dividends and wages is irrelevant.
10  The reader may readily verify that  this condition is satisfied by the Baumol-Tobin  transac-
tions technology,  S(8, M)  :  r E  /M.
rl  This  presupposes  that  the Eovernment can use lump-sum  taxation  to remove money from
circulation-a  dubious assumption at best.
12  Basically, firms  want  to  concentrate net earnings in  periods during  which  the tax  on net
earnings is relatively  low.
13  The latter  equations are derived in an earrier version of this paper (Koenig  [19g6]), for the
case  in which 6"'  =  O.
14  A  complete characterization  of the  transa.ctions technologies which  have this  property  is
beyond the scope of this paper.  My  impression is that  any such characterization would  have to
impose restrictions on the third-order  partial  derivatives of the transactions cost function;  ,g  (., .).
15  Firms will  ruazl to be as large as possible, in order to take advantage of economies  of scale
in the transactions technology.
16  The  second-order  conditions from  the  household maximization  problem  require  that  the
term  -cu" 
fu'  be greater lhan r /2.7r  Only the steady--etate  versions  of the second--order  conditions are relevant to the linearized
dynamics of the model.
25